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Summary
In this paper we estimate a demand for private medical services equation based on the
tradition of the Grossman´s model of demand for health using data for a panel of
Spanish households. The econometric specification accounts for the censored nature of
the data, which arises from no participation and infrequency of purchases, and the
existence of unobserved heterogeneity, which arises from the non observability of
health stata. Our evidence suggests that ignoring these features can have a significant
impact on the size, sign and significance of the model estimates. The estimates for the
participation and consumption processes also suggest that the deduction of
expenditures on health care currently applicable in the Spanish tax system are positively
associated to income and fertility.
KEY WORDS: Demand for health, latent variables, panel data.3
1. Introduction
Health care takes one of the largest shares of the public budget in countries
such as Spain, where citizens have access to subsidised assistance in both publicly and
privately owned centers, enjoy several copayment schedules in the purchase of
medicines and are also able to claim a 15% tax deduction for all expenses on health
care. Recently, measures such as the exclusion of a substantive range of medicines from
the  list of products within the copayment schedules have been implemented in order to
curb public expenditure. The concern about the distributional effects of this and related
potential policy changes on the population has brought the debate on fiscal matters
associated with health care to the attention of both academics and decision makers. In
particular, the effects of the tax expenditure associated with the deductions mentioned
above are worth analysing. Who do these deductions benefit? Could they be replaced
by some kind of tax expenditure related to demographic structure?
In this paper we provide an empirical account of the consumption of one of the
components in the vector of health care inputs of Spanish households: privately
purchased medical services. This category of consumption includes all expenditure on
visits to practitioners, specialists or surgery related to all types of treatments except
dental care. The study of the patterns of consumption for this component of private
health care is partly motivated by the fact that these services are available in the public
network at no monetary cost. The data shows clearly that only a portion of the
population participates in the purchase of these services, and it is conceivable that the
benefits of greater promptness of delivery
1 and/or perceived quality are enjoyed by
households in the upper part of the income distribution. This raises the question of
whether the associated tax deduction is regressive. In parallel, it is interesting to assess
how price sensitive this type of demand is, for a withdrawal of the tax expenditures can4
lead to substantial reductions in usage, part of which might have to be absorbed by the
public sector.
In order to shed some light on the questions posed above, we estimate a
demand for private medical services equation based on the tradition of Grossman’s
2
demand for health model. This model motivates not only the choice of the variables that
we use in order to explain the variation in demand but also the incorporation of 
unobserved heterogeneity in the econometric specification. A second econometric issue
arises due to the fact that the category of expenditure that we examine is i) not
universally consumed and ii) is purchased infrequently. As it is well known, standard
estimators for limited dependent variable models such as the tobit are not appropriate in
these circumstances.
In section 2 we briefly comment upon the economic model on which our
empirical analysis will be based and highlight the fact that Grossman´s formulation leads
naturally to an econometric model with unobserved heterogeneity. In section 3 we
discuss the data on which we estimate the model and describe the nature of the
censoring processes before proposing an estimator related to the family of multivariate
models analysed by Blundell and Meghir
3 that deals simultaneously with the possibility
of no participation and the noise induced by infrequent purchases. In this section we
also describe the way in which the LDV estimates are used in order to deal with the
unobserved heterogeneity problem. Section 4 presents the empirical results and section
5 concludes.
2. The demand for private medical services as a health care input
The demand for private medical services we are about to specify is related to
the demand for health care in Grossman´s model. Recall that in the latter agents6
can be used as a proxy, the model above will have to be estimated in the presence of
unobserved heterogeneity.
3. Data and econometric specification
3.1 The censoring problem
The data we use is taken from the Spanish Continuous Family Expenditure
Survey (CFES). This is a quarterly expenditure survey where a (stratified) random
sample of 3200 households is rotated in 1/8 every quarter. This allows the construction
of panels with information on households covering up to 8 quarters. In particular we
use a balanced panel of 6100 households observed during 8 time periods. The time
periods range from the first quarter of 1986 to the last of 1987 for the first households
that entered the survey and the third quarter of 1992 to the second quarter of 1994 for
the most recent entrants in our sample.
Apart from detailed demographic information, the survey contains records on
11 categories of health related expenditures, namely medicines with and without
prescription, other pharmaceutical products, therapeutical material with and without
subsidy, medical services, dental services, nursing services, hospital services, insurance
premia and a residual category. The quality of the information contained in these
records varys according to the monitoring period (the length of time over which the
household is asked to report expenditures, which in this survey can be either one week,
one month or one quarter). In some cases, such as prescribed medicines, it is just one
week and we find that 70% of households are not observed spending on this category
in any of the 8 periods. To some extent this is due to the fact that the copayment for
prescriptions is zero for a substantial part of the population. But the problem of
infrequent purchases is pervasive: even if all households have to face the full cost of self7
prescriptions, only 43% report a positive expenditure over any of the 8 periods.
Further, more than half of these (23% of the total) have one positive record only.
The situation improves when the monitoring period is the month, as is the case
with our object of study. In table 1 we present the pattern of observed positive
expenditures on private medical services and the mean and median of the purchases by
number of observed purchases. The table shows that 42.7% of the 6100 households are
never observed purchasing this category of health care. The rest of households are
observed incurring positive purchases at least once and roughly one third of the total
are observed purchasing more than once. The median expenditure is 15000 pta. per
quarter and the mean level is around 25000 pta per quarter.
For the rest of categories the percentage of households who never report a
positive expenditure are 68% (dental services), 91% (nursing services), 98% (hospital
services), 96% (therapeutical material with subsidy), 57% (therapeutical material
without subsidy), (79%) insurance premia and 99% (residual category).
Insert table 1 about here
The econometrics literature distinguishes three main causes for the existence of
zero records in micro expenditure surveys, namely no participation in the consumption
of the relevant commodity, corner solutions and infrequent purchases. In many
applications it is reasonable to assume from the outset which cause operates. For
instance, in studies on the demand for clothing it would be reasonable to assume
infrequency of purchase to be the main explanation. Similarly, in the case of the demand
for tobacco, abstention (no participation) will explain a substantial proportion of zero
records
6-7. For some goods, however, there is no clear cut cause and, in a cross section
of households, more than one or even the three causes might induce the existence of8
zero records. The case of expenditures on health care are a paradigmatic example of
this type of situations. Even if it can reasonably be argued that all households
participate in the consumption of some form of health care (i.e. there are no non-
participants in the sense applicable to tobacco consumption or labour force
participation), the existence of different types of copayment policies, substitutes at zero
money cost and the difference between monitoring periods and the period for which
information in the survey is supposed to be representative, leads to the existence of a
high percentage of zero records when dissaggregated categories are examined.
In the particular case of household expenditure on private medical services in
Spain, the existence of a free substitute will clearly induce some households to never
consume this type of service. This free substitute is the coverage given by the social
security contributions, which is provided either through publicly owned outlets, the
case for most households, or the private sector, the case for some of the households
who are entitled to choose which provider their contributions are directed to (civil
servants). Similarly, households who buy private insurance on top of the compulsory
scheme will rarely be observed paying for this service unless there exist a copayment
contract. Concerning the latter group, only 20% of the households who ever purchase
private medical services are observed ever paying for an insurance premium. However,
the survey pools together policies that cover medical assistance with those that provide
compensation from death so it is not possible to know whether the latter group of
households are really covered for medical assistance. In any case the presumption that a
portion of the population does not participate in the consumption of this category is
consistent with the evidence shown in table 1, which suggests that there are some
households who never purchase private medical services and can be classifyed as non
participants, and, moreover, we are able to identify them. The data also suggest that
those who participate in the consumption of this commodity do not do so every month.
For these households, a pattern of alternating positive and zero records is observed.
This structure for the data generating process implies that, first, a household decides15
purchase process and the consumption process in a first step. This produces a
prediction for log y
* according to equation 11 for each household, which is then used as
the dependent variable in equation 12. The table includes statistics for the null
hypothesis of no fit and the relevant measures of goodness of fit.
Insert table 2 about here
The specification for participation (column I) includes variables that proxy
situations which pose a threat to health such as the risks involved in child bearing and
neonatal related diseases and the existence of smokers in the household. Both of these
increase significantly the probability of participation with respect to the reference
household. A higher level of current household income affects positively the probability
of participation for two reasons: higher ability to pay and a higher opportunity cost for
the waiting time due to foregone earnings. Employment, in whichever form but more
so for white collar workers, increases the probability of participation with respect to the
reference households where the head is not active or unemployed. Owners occupiers 
were expected to be more likely to participate due to the correlation of this
characteristic with life time wealth and thus ability to pay and the results show a
significant (at the 10% level) positive impact. The observation of a payment for
insurance premia is not associated with any significant effect on the probability of
participation. As mentioned before, the premia payments that we observe in the survey
include life insurance policies and consequently are an imperfect indicator for the
existence of coverage for private medical services.
Concerning the process for frequency of purchases (in column II), we have
included the size of the household as a proxy for the frequency with which the need to
purchase the service arises. The corresponding estimate suggests a positive and
significant impact. The presence of babies of less than one year of age or a pregnant
woman also seem to affect positively the frequency of purchases. Household income16
(excluding income from capital), the availability of private transport, and the
participation of the spouse in the labour market have been included in the specification
for the frequency of purchase in order to proxy the opportunity cost (foregone earnings
and/or leisure) of visits, but neither seems to exert a significant effect.
Turning to the consumption equation, note that while OLS estimates suggest
that every decade there is a decrease in consumption of 3% and the ML estimator
suggest an insignificant effect, the censored panel estimator (column IV) suggests a
significant increase of 5% every decade. Once the effect of participation is netted out,
both the ML and the censored panel estimator (the latter in a significant way) show a
negative effect associated with the presence of babies or pregnancy on the consumption
schedule. It is interesting to note that while two latter factors affect participation
positively, they reduce consumption conditional to participation. This might be caused
by the income effect associated with a larger family size. Both categories of education
are associated with a greater (and by a sizeable percentage) consumption with respect
to households headed by an individual with basic schooling. Note also that both the ML
and OLS estimators show an U profile for the effect of household income on
consumption. However the profile shown in column IV has always a positive slope, and
moreover, this slope is increasing with the level of  (log) income. Thus the associated
elasticity of expenditure with respect to income increases with the latter. The estimated
value at the mean of income is 0.34, which reveals the necessity (conditional upon
participation) nature of the service under consideration.
Concerning the estimated price elasticity, note that since our dependent variable
is expenditure, it is obtained by substracting one to the coefficient on the logarithm of
prices. The censored panel estimate is -1.41. The price sensitivity that this estimator
suggests is very much greater than the one associated with the OLS estimator, -0.6.17
It seems clear, therefore, that ignoring the censoring processes and unobserved
heterogeneity can lead to substantially different results, apart from ignoring relevant
information such as the separate effects on participation and rate of consumption that
some factors may have.
4.2 Implications for health and fiscal policies
The results suggest that the probability of participation in the consumption of
private medical care is positively associated with two relevant characteristics from the
point of view of fiscal policy, namely wealth (proxied by income, occupational category
and home ownership status) and fertility (pregnancy and presence of small children).
Conditional on participation, income exerts a positive effect on the rate of consumption
too. It would seem, therefore, that the tax deduction associated with the consumption
of private medical care is regressive, at least in the sense that the absolute amounts
deducted are greater for richer households. Withdrawing or reducing these deductions
would penalise households within fertility periods. But the existing deductions for
children could be increased to compensate this effect.
As far as second round effects (behavioural responses) are concerned, the
estimated elasticity of -1.41 suggests that increases in prices would lead to more than
proportional changes in demand for private medical services. A withdrawal or
reduction of the deduction is very much equivalent to an increase in prices (even if its
effect is not perceived until tax forms are filled), so it would be reasonable to expect a
substantial reduction in demand for private medical services should the government
eliminate it completely. Whether a parallel increase in demand at public outlets would
ensue is something that our estimated model cannot produce inferences about. The
crucial issue here is the extent to which Spanish households perceive private medical
services as a close substitute for their public counterparts, and this is an issue which
merits further research.18
The ability of these results to provide insights into the likely consequences of
revisions in the copayment policies of other categories of health care currently provided
by the Spanish public health network is also limited. However, in connection with the
recent government plans for the withdrawal of the subsidy for a substantial number of
medicines, a policy relevant message might be extracted: participation in the
consumption of private health care is associated with ability to pay. Thus the
maintenance of close substitutes within the subsidised list would cushion the effects of
the policy change on households at the bottom of the income distribution.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we have estimated a demand for private medical services equation
based in the tradition of Grossman´s model of demand for health using data for a panel
of Spanish households. We have paid particular attention to the censored nature of the
data and the existence of unobserved heterogeneity and our results suggest that
ignoring these issues has a significant impact on the size, sign and significance of the
parameters of the model. The estimated demand equation offers useful policy evidence
on the likely effects of altering expenditure deduction schemes currently applicable in
the Spanish tax system.19
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I II III IV V
ML ML ML WGC OLS
Household size 0.043 0.102 0.081 0.090
(2.73) (3.51) (22.57) (13.92)
Baby or pregnancy* 0.167 0.167 -0.234 -0.064 0.133
(2.07) (2.45) -(1.17) -(7.82) (3.34)
Smoking members* 0.121
(3.33)
H. of household has secondary education* -0.015 0.103 0.195 -0.020
-(0.37) (1.82) (25.36) -(0.86)
H. of household has university education* 0.117 0.168 0.224 0.139
(1.89) (1.36) (15.59) (3.91)
Log total household real income 0.118 -0.031 -0.472 0.018 -0.115
(4.85) -(0.94) -(3.68) (3.04) -(3.25)
Log total household real income squared 0.048 0.019 0.021
(4.34) (30.19) (6.90)
Log real price of private medical services 1.152 -0.414 0.408
(2.26) -(9.21) (3.17)
Age of head of household -0.004 -0.003 0.002 0.005 -0.003
-(2.26) -(1.61) (0.65) (9.32) -(4.00)
Quarter 1* 0.085 0.083 0.019 0.026
(1.34) (0.68) (6.47) (0.99)
Quarter 2* 0.087 0.088 0.146 0.096
(1.37) (0.72) (49.15) (3.67)
Quarter 4* 0.080 0.162 0.062 0.051
(1.24) (1.29) (21.28) (1.94)




Head of household is self employed* 0.191
(3.40)
Head of household is blue collar worker* 0.180
(2.79)
Head of household is white collar worker* 0.247
(4.66)
Owner occupier household* 0.076
(1.81)
Under coverage of private insurance* 0.054
(1.32)
_cons -0.850 -0.405 4.290 1.979 0.307
-(4.01) -(1.31) (6.41) (50.84) (2.26)
N 6100 3494 3494 27952 48800
Chi squared (df in parenthesis) 233 (11) 7165(21) 7165(21)
F (11, ¥) 17.90 8.20
Pseudo R-squared/R-squared 0.02 0.49 0.49 0.23 0.07